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1. Introduction: Spanish and American law as cultural, anthropological    
    products  
The aim of this paper is to describe the differences between the Spanish 
system of law as a civil system, and the American system of law as common 
law one, specifically in the area of contractual texts. The possibility of inter-
legal communication across barriers in a global world has to take into 
account what Vogt has called the ‘Anglo-internationalisation of business’, 
with  major impact over the last two decades and ‘unlikely to change in the 
near future’ (Vogt, 2004:13). The economic, social and political pre-
eminence of countries like USA or UK has made the usage of public and 
private legislation instruments like world agreements universal (UNCTAD, 
ICC and UNCITRAL conventions), and this assertion can also be applied to 
international contracts in the form of INCOTERMS, for example. Therefore, 
teaching English with Legal Purposes to lawyers, translators and philologists 
has become a necessary practice, which involves the learners’ understanding 
of differences and subtleties between the legal tradition of the English-
speaking world and, in the Spanish context, the Continental law, which also 
constitutes the basis of legal practices in many countries of the EU. 
 
This paper will try to prove that the awareness of not only different types of 
discourse, but mainly of different cultural patterns is of the essence when 
teaching English with Legal Purposes to Spanish students. These two means 
of communication –legal English, legal Spanish- pertain to different systems 
of law, and have to be explained as cultural products. Consequently,  I will be 
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contemplating these two systems of law as cultural products, and, hence, will 
deem their sources and hermeneutics, or interpretive mechanisms, as 
influenced by the patterns of thinking of each civilization, their perception of 
the external and conceptual world. Geertz declares that (1983: 4): “the shapes 
of knowledge are always ineluctably local, indivisible from their instruments 
and their encasement”. There are not one, but many models of cultural 
knowledge; a range of culturally-shared schematised systems that exist side 
by side with other cultural systems, encasing other subsystems in their turn, 
as encountered in the different scopes of human experience. These 
schematizations are reinforced and perpetuated through language, as the tool 
that orders the way in which we arrange our experience of the world. In 
Šarčević’s words (1997: 13): “despite fundamental similarities among its 
constituent legal systems, a legal family does not correspond to a biological 
reality”. 
 
Indeed, legal models also change from culture to culture, as culturally-bound 
sets of tacit constructs. Accordingly, legal systems are not uniform and 
constant for each and every civilization, but different from one another and in 
tune with a whole array of conditions whereupon they evolve and which 
frame them as unique and peculiar to each legal tradition. Just as there is not 
one but numerous languages, legal models also change from culture to 
culture, through history, through political and economic changes; they are 
likely to be more static in some cultures, more pliable in others, depending on 
a whole array of conditions whereupon they evolve and that frame them as 
unique and peculiar to each legal tradition 
 
Tönnies (1957 in Steward and Bennet, 1991: 7) distinguishes between and 
Gemeinschaft  and Gesellschaft societies. In what he terms as a more 
primeval Gemeinschaft society, social ties are based on emotion and 
sentiment, and identity is bound up with belonging to the community. Its 
members belong to a world of relationships, more sensitive to social context 
as a whole, where functions in the groups are shared widely among members, 
than in groups composed of analytical persons. Gesellschaft societies are a 
later, more sophisticated development, where formal, contractual ties ─based 
on rational agreement and self-interest and regulated by law─ support 
impersonal social relations.  
 
For Steward and Bennet (1991: 11), the American thinking is typical of a 
Gesellschaft society. Epistemology in the United States  is analytical, 
procedural, and its inductive style is represented by the generation of models 
and hypotheses based upon empirical observation that disregards information 
by word of mouth or gossip. It is an operational, pragmatical style of 
thinking, leading to stress on consequences and results and concentrating in 
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decision-making and problem-solving techniques. It is the individual who has 
the power to affect her environment. In contrast, these researchers (1991: 9) 
talk of the European Continent as favouring “declarative” knowledge, the 
type of epistemology that describes the world, rather than acts on it. The 
pragmatic approach of the Americans is very different from the European 
style, which emphasises theory and organic concepts. Scientific work is 
considered as the elaboration and confirmation of previous theories, rather 
than on innovations, and concepts are living realities (Martinedale, 1960:91 
in Steward and Bennet, 1991). Within this European context, Spain shares 
many of the characteristics of a declarative epistemology. In addition, it also 
seems to belong to a more developed kind of Gemeinschaft society that 
Steward and Bennet (1991: 7) define as a “relational”, “interpersonal” one, 
with a high degree of sensitivity to context, relationships and status (Orts 
Llopis, 2006: 294). 
 
2. Law and the search for knowledge: epistemological differences in legal  
    traditions 
As suggested above, the Spanish and the American legal traditions come 
from very different epistemological attitudes towards thought and science. 
From the beginning of the Modern Age, Bacon’s Novum Organum  (1620) -
an heir to Aristotle’s Organon- as well as Newton’s work (1642-1727), 
constitute landmarks for the inception of English Empiricism, subsequently 
developed by Locke (1632-1704) and Hume (1711-1776) and preceded, in 
turn, by the nominalist William of Ockham (1290-1350). “Ockam’s Razor” 
was a common, powerful principle in medieval philosophy. It denied the 
existence of universals, defining them as termini concepti, or final terms that 
signify individual things. Actually, in the empirical search for knowledge, 
raw data are primordial to the existence of a thing, and the validity of 
inferring the existence of universals from individuals is out of the question.  
Empiricism as a whole displaces the search for logic, adopting inductive, 
operational patterns of thinking instead, with little attention paid to the 
overall framework in which people’s actions take place. The hunt for truth is 
based on objective realities, from which measurable results can be attained 
(Moya and Novella, 2003:117, 205).  
 
A blatantly opposed attitude to sciences was developed in the European 
tradition of thought. Descartes’s both Discourse on Method and Geometry 
(1637) endeavour to go beyond universal mathematics, in the attempt to 
discover the nature of intelligence. The Cartesian tradition of thought, taken 
up by Spinoza (1632-1677) and Leibniz (1646-1716), asserts that, in 
principle, all knowledge, including scientific knowledge, can be gained with 
reason alone. In fact, the Continental European deductive and more abstract 
style of thinking gives priority to the conceptual world and symbolic wisdom, 
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attaching primacy and reality to ideas and theories. Deductive thinkers are 
likely to have more confidence in their theories than in the raw data of 
empirical observation, so it suffices, for their epistemological purposes, to 
show one or two connections between their concepts and the empirical world 
(Moya and Novella, 2003:159-231).  
 
Epistemological postures have also had an influence in legal traditions. 
Radbruch (1958 in Ghirardi, 2003: 20) points out that Oxford and 
Cambridge, embracing British Empiricism, endeavoured to study the 
quadrivium (arithmetic, geometry, music, astronomy), whereas the Sorbonne 
tacked the trivium (grammar, rhetoric, dialectic). Common law was thus 
influenced by Roman law in its most classic methodology and spirit, and 
Continental law subsequently pursued the Justinian code, the Corpus Juris, 
and its subsequent modifications. In the context of Continental law, it is easy 
to see how in the light of these statements and of our reasoning above, 
European Formalism developed into legal dogmatism in the second half of 
the 18th century. During this period, jurists started to develop ideal models of 
perfect, complete, universal legal systems. During the 19th century, the 
codification of civil law took off, with the paradigm of the 1804 French Civil 
Code, or Napoleon Code, which is the basis of Continental law today.  
 
Nevertheless, to fully understand civil law one must realize that Continental 
Europe received civil law from ancient Rome, but did not retain it in the 
same way everywhere (Tetley, 1999:596). Scotland, for example, retained it 
without codification, and, outside Europe, other places of the world like 
Quebec or Louisiana developed their own codes. In Europe, codes like those 
of unified Italy (1865), Portugal (1867) and Spain (1889) were directly 
influenced by the French Civil Code, which was called the Code Napoléon 
because of the personal interest of the Emperor to reflect the achievements of 
the French Revolution. The philosophy underlying civil law during the 
drafting of the Code was to provide stable societies with comprehensive sets 
of codes adopted by legislature, set forth in a logical scheme, addressing all 
issues. Hence, Formalism, as an extreme end of civil-law philosophy views 
law as a coherent, economic and precise system of norms, from which all 
solutions can be drawn. The only valid source of law is legislation, by virtue 
of springing from a competent legal authority. Jurists, and not judges, are the 
sole drafters and interpreters of law, the only hermeneutical method is 
deduction, and the judge’s only function is discerning between the inclusion 
or exclusion of the case under the norm.  
 
In contrast, the Common law is the legal tradition that developed in England 
from the 11th century onwards. It is the basis of law, not only for England, 
Ireland and Wales, but also for forty-nine U.S, States, Canada and the 
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Commonwealth. This legal system corresponds to the reality of a dynamic 
world, where social changes take place continuously and where an unwritten, 
flowing, flexible system is preferable. In connection with British Empiricism, 
it gave rise to legal realism, a trend that denies general norms the character of 
a paradigm pre-existent to judicial decision (Gómez and Bruera, 1995: 96). 
According to these authors, the legal Realism of Ross, Pound and  Cardozo 
reveals a sceptical attitude towards the value of norms. It is a behavioural 
trend that defends the legal system is made up of a group of specific court 
decisions, the only source of law being precedent. Judges are the creators of 
law and have the widest freedom to interpret the case.  
 
As Gomez and Bruera state (íbid), the extreme positions described above – 
Formalism and Realism- have a very strong ideological flavour and constitute 
opposed overstatements of the juridical reality. On the one hand, the civil law 
tradition arises from the articulation of rules by an absolute monarch. In the 
countries where Formalism develops, juridical dogmatism has been 
originated and developed in the context of a strong legislative power, in 
opposition to a weaker judiciary. According to Tetley (1999: 591), civil law 
judges follow Rousseau’s theories that the State is the source of all rights 
under the social contract. The Common Law tradition itself evolves from the 
sheer constraint of the monarch’s powers, in opposition to which the people 
takes initiative and elects a strong judiciary power. Tetley (íbid) points out 
that English judges favour Hobbes’ theory that the individual agrees to 
convey the State a certain amount of limited rights. Realism, as an extreme 
version of these postulates, defends the position of judges as the creators of 
law and recognises precedents as the only valid legal source.  
 
 
3. Different philosophies, different systems, different features in the  
    interpretation of legal language in America and Spain 
The epistemology of each culture is, indeed, the origin of different attitudes 
about the nature of law, the role of law in society, the organization of the 
legal system in each legal tradition (Merryman, 1985: 1).  Ostensibly, the 
Continental and Common Law both belong to the ample family of Western 
law, as opposed to Moslem law, Hindu law, Jewish law, the laws of the Far 
East, the African tradition and the Scandinavian one (Merryman, 1985:5). As 
Tetley himself points out (2003: 7), mixed legal systems exist where the law 
in force is derived from more than one legal tradition, with different legal 
jurisdictions, different court systems, and different languages. Quebec or the 
Egyptian legal systems would be examples of this phenomenon, and the 
European Union –a central system with a polyphony of singular States-  is 
becoming a peculiar one as well, where Common and Continental law are 
forced to coexist (Tetley, 2003:24-26). 
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Even if functionally they are relatively similar, the Common and Continental 
law traditions are very different in nature. In tune with the epistemological 
context in which they evolve, the Common law tradition is based upon fact, 
the Continental one on legal principles. Accordingly, Common law 
judgements extensively expose the facts, the judge and jury actively 
participating in seeking evidence and examining witnesses. Contrarily, in the 
inquisitorial arrangement of the Continental process the proceeding 
culminates in a trial dominated by lawyers with the judge as a referee, and 
decisions first identify the legal principles that might be relevant, verifying 
their application if prominent. In addition, in the descriptive nature of 
Continental law, the judge uses her deductive reasoning to determine the 
applicable sections of the Code, and remedies not contemplated within the 
written text are inadmissible. In the empirical context of the Common law, 
though, the judge uses her inductive reasoning about facts, applicable prior 
cases and the relevant law to reach a decision, with the freedom to decide an 
equitable, fair remedy, even if not contemplated before.  
 
Traditionally, legal language has always been considered difficult, prolix and 
far-fetched, being sometimes rejected by users and institutions alike as an 
unreadable and even decadent register. These complaints are widespread and 
could be applied to the language of any legal system in the EU, both in the 
Continental and Common law areas.  
 
However, and even if law is a profession of words in any system, the truth is 
that the Common law one possesses some features that make it easy for 
language per se to be a real issue of discussion. Regarding interpretation, law 
is based on legislation and codes in the Continental systems −scrutinised in a 
very general way and wide scope − when applying law to life. In contrast, the 
Common law system is one based upon empirical postulates:  cases are 
applied, rather than legislation.  This implies that the judicature is awarded a 
very special position in the scheme of things, as the figure of the judge is 
supposed, not only to interpret law, but to make law when adjudicating. In 
doing so, the judicial figure has to separate the ratio decidendi, or main 
arguments of the previous case at hand −which are legally binding to him− 
from the obiter dicta, or additional comments made by the previous judge, 
which are not to be followed compulsorily by him/her when deciding the 
case. This way of ruling brings along a very complex hermeneutic process 
that is very often one of construction (Alcaraz, 1994), that is, a process of 
granting legal meaning where there was previously none. This construction 
stage very often amounts to be a veritable linguistic analysis (Solan, 1993: 
28), since lexical, syntactic as well as pragmatic exercises are required on the 
judicial part in order to extract  that meaning and its right implementation to 
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real life. In this kind of interpretive process of adjudication every word 
counts, and it is precisely the tension between precision –to be as accurate as 
possible− and flexibility –to be able to capture every possible contingency in 
life affairs− which, ironically, makes legal language so difficult to 
understand. 
 
Under the Continental codified legal system, and in tune with the organic, 
theoretical tradition of knowledge, legislation constitutes the primary source 
of law. Civil law codes and statutes are concise, stating principles in wide, 
general phrases. These principles need not be explained, as they are supposed 
to be succinct declarations of the spirit of the law and not to be read 
restrictively. Hence, as Solan establishes (2005:77), legal systems based upon 
Roman law are more laid back when having to apply contextual 
interpretation to legal texts, and language, even if playing a relevant role, is 
less central in the hermeneutical process. This allows courts to resort to the 
purpose of the text without the same suspicious attitude that prevails in the 
hardest Anglosaxon Textualism. Nevertheless, even if such reasoning about 
the interpretive processes of these systems and their epistemological origins 
remains true, it is also a fact that no pure, extreme positions exist within a 
legal tradition,  untangling thus the paradox that in an empiricist, realist 
context like that of Common Law, formalist streaks also exist that prevent the 
interpretation according to context. On the other hand, it may also result 
somewhat contradictory that in an organic, theoretical, indeed formalist 
Continental Law context, some empiricism is also allowed when the 
application of the law is susceptible to be completed by extra-linguistic 
matters when the text is not sufficiently clear.  
 
In addition, looking at the anthropological analysis of both traditions, my 
study assumes that Spain is a case of high contextuality, indirect style, 
whereas the GB and USA are the opposite case. Indeed, the way in which 
these different cultural approaches are envisioned has very much to do with 
the way in which the legal traditions in each of these countries articulate their 
law and its interpretation. Reed & Hall (1990) and Schuster & Copeland 
(1995) talk about low-context, direct-style cultures and about high-context, 
indirect style ones. In the first group, the final outcome of a negotiation is 
usually specific and concrete, as the ultimate aim is for the contract to 
contemplate every possible contingency that may take place in the course of 
its performance. In contrast, in high-context cultures, the approach is much 
wider in scope, as drafting clauses in a very detailed way would prove to be a 
hindrance for the flexibility of agreements developing in the ever-changing 
circumstances of real life. Specifically, Edward Hall (1976, 2000), stated that 
all cultures can be situated in relation to one another through the styles in 
which they communicate. Essentially, high-context communication involves 
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implying a message through that which is not uttered. This includes the 
situation, behaviour, and para-verbal cues as integral parts of the 
communicated message. High-context cultures have a greater amount of 
shared knowledge. As a result different assumptions are made as to the 
amount of information a verbal or written message carries. They are 
characterized by extensive information networks among family, friends, 
associates, and even clients. Their relationships are close and personal. They 
keep well informed about the people who are important in their lives. This 
extensive background knowledge is automatically brought to bear in giving 
meaning s to events and communications. Nothing that happens to them can 
be described as an isolated event; everything is connected to meaningful 
context. 
 
People in low-context cultures, on the other hand, tend to compartmentalize 
their lives and relationships. They permit little "interference" of "extraneous" 
information. Thus, in order to give detailed meaning to an event, they require 
detailed information in a communication. The "context" must be explicit in 
the message.  According to Reed Hall and Hall (1989) context is probably the 
most important cultural dimension and the most difficult to define. It refers to 
the entire array of stimuli surrounding every communication event - the 
context - and how much of those stimuli are meaningful. One might expect, 
therefore, that low-context communications are unavoidably wordier, or more 
prolix, than high-context messages, since they have to carry more 
information. In fact, the opposite is sometimes true: low-context cultures use 
language with great precision and economy, as every word is meaningful. 
Contrarily, in high-context cultures, language is licentious: since words have 
relatively less value, they are overspent. 
 
High-and low-context cultures have radically different views of reality. And 
the further apart they are on the context scale, the more difficult it is to 
communicate between them. This applies not only to different primary 
cultures, but also between different professional and functional cultures 
within a single primary culture. Indeed, context differences between work 
functions can lead to dire misunderstandings. These differences in 
communication styles across cultures are expected to pose challenges to the 
ways in which people in business communicate their messages most 
optimally. 
 
4. The interpretation of contractual language in Spain and the United  
    States 
Spain has a compact body of rules for contract, but legislators and drafters try 
to make their assertions as general as possible, and the attempt to cover every 
contingence and detail of reality and its multiple complexities is out of the 
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question. In contrast, in the ontological interpretive technique of the Common 
Law of GB and USA every word counts, and it is the aim of the contract to 
be able to capture every possible eventuality that may arise in the course of 
the deal. In the high-context, rationalistic tradition of Spanish law, legislators 
and drafters try to make their assertions as general as possible, and the 
attempt to cover every contingence and detail of reality and its multiple 
complexities is out of the question. Indeed, due to the tradition that features 
it, the Spanish contract is, like its Continental fellows, intentionally open-
ended and generalist. As Bender points out, legal texts in the Spanish scope 
have to be interpreted in their ordinary meaning, “but also in relation to the 
context, the historical and legislative background, and the social reality of the 
time at which they are to be applied, with particular attention to their spirit 
and aim” (Bender, 2003:2).  This heavy intentional, indeed contextual, accent 
implies that texts are construed as a whole, analysed in the light of the bulk of 
their overall meaning and drafted so as to adapt flexibly to the desired results 
in each case. In this panorama, overgeneralisation is a bonus, not a liability, 
of the system. To achieve the elasticity required, texts have to be composed 
in a way that allow for some vagueness to occur. This is not to say that 
hermeneutics are loose as far as the Spanish legal text is concerned. In fact, 
vagueness and ambiguity problems provoke the concern of some scholars 
(Iturralde, 1989: 35). In this sense, the norms to interpret statute law within 
the Continental system (Wroblewski, 1988 in Iturralde, 1989:30) , admit that 
every word is potentially vague and, even when it is not, it may become a 
source of doubt in its future applications. Thus, a system of legal definition 
has been developed to gauge meaning in those cases where clarity is at stake, 
even if the formalist tradition of civil law imposes that legal texts have to be 
clear enough, that definitions have to be provided by legislators, and that the 
extralinguistic context will play a helping role in case of natural fuzziness.  
 
Contrarily, in the inductive legal tradition within which Common Law exists, 
legal interpretation is mainly literal and based upon a word-by-word 
construction, as the literal and golden rules of interpretation command.  The 
ontological interpretive technique of the Common Law of GB and USA 
grants that every word counts and it is the aim of the contract to be able to 
capture every possible eventuality that may arise in the course of the deal. In 
this legal tradition every word has its own specific weight, and, consequently, 
to construe law and subsequently apply it, words have to be dismembered, 
pulled apart, so as to disambiguate the text. Only then, is the relationship 
between context and cotext to be regarded. Hence, English legal texts have to 
resort, ideally, to autonomy of interpretation. This fact implies that the text 
itself is supposed to supply all the data for its own clarification and 
subsequent application. Literal, or textual interpretation does not have to pose 
problems of interpretation necessarily.  
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Nevertheless, things seldom take place ideally in this world and meaning in 
the Anglo-Saxon legal text is, more often than not, uncertain, as paronyms 
and legal homonyms are usual characteristics of the lexicon within these 
systems. Ambiguity can also be seen as a resource of the system in order to 
achieve pliability and such is the case with famous and recurrent adjectives 
like reasonable, constructive, due, actual or fair, which act as wild cards to 
grant latitude of judgment to judges. According to Tiersma (1999:80) this 
kind of terms permit legislation not to “articulate in advance exactly what is 
included within it (…). It permits the law to adapt to differing circumstances 
and communities within a jurisdiction (…) to deal with novel situations 
which are likely to arise in the future”.  
 
The rules that regulate contractual relationships in the legal framework in the 
United States on the one hand, and those in Spain, on the other, are very 
different in nature. Indeed, the Civil Code of Spain allows for a contract to be 
construed according to the intent of the parties entering the agreement, 
whereas, according to Solan (2005:78) in the United States the parol rule 
forbids courts to make use of evidence other than the language of the contract 
itself when the terms are unclear. Solan himself advocates for contextualizing 
hermeneutics to be implemented in order to avoid vagueness, stating that 
some states in the country are more lenient than others in this matter. Still, 
and with the blessings of New Textualists like Justice Antonin Scalia (Solan, 
2005: 85), who regard the language in the text sufficient to reach fair 
decisions, the parol evidence rule still applies in most cases.  
 
5. Some final words. The relevance of our study for the understanding  
    and application of legal English 
The prominence of this analysis lies in the recent debate and interest that has 
arisen with the upcoming of “mixed jurisdictions” as a result, firstly, of the 
European Union bringing together many legal systems under the same single 
legislature (Tetley, 2003:25,26). But most importantly, “mixed jurisdictions” 
also occur because of what has been termed as the “Americanization of law” 
(Audit, 2001:1). The Western Bloc promotes and supports globalization and a 
restrictive theory of sovereignty, being the US itself the proponent of the 
development of multilateral institutions like the United Nations, the World 
Bank, or the International Monetary Fund. In addition, what is labelled as the 
Anglo-internationalisation of business has had a strong impact over the last 
two decades and seems to be here to stay (Vogt, 2004:13). Consequently, 
international transactions are carried out in English as the main 
communication tool, thus, litigation and legal practice worldwide are being 
conducted in English.   
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In the context of legal matter that involve mercantile transactions between 
individuals, it is important to note that civil law divides the areas of private 
and public law, focusing on rights and obligations of individuals in each area. 
In contrast, Common law has no wholly unitary system for prerogatives and 
obligations, but depends on courts (of Common law, the law itself,  or 
Equity, fairness as applied by courts) to grant the necessary remedy, and it is 
only through previous cases that rights and obligations can be found. Despite 
these differences, never wholly understood in the multinational application of 
law, it is also fair to remark that when focusing on the area of contract, the 
universality of Merchant law has to be considered. “The phenomenon of 
commercial exchange spreads worldwide and goes beyond cultures and 
frontiers, being shaped by progress and evolution” (Duro, 1997:13, my 
translation). This international leaning makes commercial law different from 
any other aspect of juridical systems at large, and brings corporate culture 
and law closer, as globalization advances.   
 
The presence of businesses in Spain and the countries with an Anglo-Saxon 
legal culture, specifically Great Britain and America, is a fact, as 
globalization has opened up these markets to international business 
opportunities. Accordingly, “in the light of their unique characteristics, each 
country must develop their cross-cultural communication skills to define their 
expectations and ensure that their goals are met” (Del Pozo, 2003: 117).  It is 
a fact that these markets -which share sets of cultural and educational values- 
must understand each other in order to work together. In this context, the 
need to understand the unique quality of each legal tradition −indeed, that of 
Spain, in the scope of this article− and its value in the context of new 
transnational agreements would become more imperative than ever in order 
to achieve harmony, understanding and respect towards national 
hermeneutical tools. 
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The purpose of the present article is to deal with the cultural differences 
rooted in the drafting and interpretation of legal contractual texts, in both 
Spanish and American English. To illustrate the way in which lawyers 
interpret language in the Spanish and the American contexts further and in 
more depth, I will start considering the different traditions of thought, which 
the legal cultures belong to and where their language is rooted. I will argue 
that Spain is part of the Franco-rationalistic approach based on deduction, 
abstract idealism, and spiritualism, while America is part of the inductive 
Anglo-Empiricist approach from naturalistic pragmatism and materialism. In 
doing so, the aim will ultimately be to discuss how the different cultural 
approaches of these two countries have very much to do with the way in 
which their legal traditions articulate contract law and its interpretation. This 
discussion, I hope, will shed some light on the terrain of English for Legal 
Purposes in Spain, its teaching and learning.   
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